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We introduce the concept of zemblanity to organization studies to refer to the enactment 
of disaster when, in systems designed to impede risk key actors nonetheless construct 
their own misfortune. The case of the Costa Concordia provides an opportunity to 
discuss organizational zemblanity. Active as well as passive behaviours by the Costa 
Concordia’s Captain created a vicious circle of inappropriate decision-making with 
traumatic effects. These were complemented by structural elements to be found both in 
the individual behaviours of others (mainly, the vessel’s first line of command) and the 
lack of other effective organizational controls, both in terms of structures and routines. 
As our discussion illuminates, there are two overarching elements in play: an excess of 
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individual discretion and a lack of proper organizational controls. We go on to consider 
the significant implications for both theory and practice that flow from our analysis. 
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January 14, 2012: 
 The wreck of the gigantic cruise ship Costa Concordia 
lies on one side as a dramatic, calm dawn breaks. The 
night before the vessel hit the rocks of the Isola del Giglio, 
off the Tuscan coast (Italy) and sank. Later, official 
reports will count 32 deaths.  
1. Introduction 
While the managerial literature is well accustomed to the concept of serendipity, in this 
paper we theorize the less well-known and little researched process of zemblanity (e.g. 
Nicholson, 2007). We do so in order to understand how organization actors sometimes 
create avoidable disasters in systems that have been designed to afford “high 
reliability”. The extant literature on high-reliability organizations (Roberts & Bea, 
2001) argues that in systems that are highly complex and interdependent, accidents will, 
nonetheless, be normal (Perrow, 1984). In these studies the focus is on organizational 
design. Much less discussed is the creative social construction of action intended to 
evade organizational designs for minimizing risk and making accidents abnormal. In the 
case of Costa Concordia (Italy, 2012) we see not so much an insufficiency of 
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organization design (Heeks & Bhatnagar, 2001) creating an accident waiting to happen 
as a catastrophic outcome (organizational performance) resulting from an excess of self-
confidence, an absence of generative doubt, the presence of (delusional) managerial 
control, and a vicious dynamic of organizational legitimacy.  
Using the concept of zemblanity we do not refer to accidents caused by sheer 
complexity (Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1997), defective (maladaptive) routines (Starbuck, 
1983), or human neglect (Weick, 2010). Instead in this paper we analyse how humans 
construct their own misfortune in systems designed to impede it? By exploring this 
question we aim to introduce the topic of organizational zemblanity as the active but 
unintentional construction of misfortune to the field of organization studies. We do so in 
the case of an event that displays how a lack of wisdom in interpretive frameworks can 
be combined with an absence of organizational controls to unleash disaster. In practice, 
events pose a particular problem for interpretive frameworks. As Deroy and Clegg 
(2011) write, drawing on Deleuze (1968) and Badiou (1993), a theory of events orients 
one to the significance of the contextual de-structuring/re-structuring of interpretive 
frameworks as more or less incomplete or contestable. As they put it, an event offers a 
potential space for action, including inflections of structural rules and design (Linstead 
& Thanem, 2007). The Costa Concordia event provides a case of organizational 
zemblanity in which both active and passive behaviours by the Captain created a vicious 
circle of bad decision outcomes (Masuch, 1985); these were complemented by structural 
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elements to be found in the individual behaviours of others (mainly, the vessel’s first 
line of command) and the lack of additional effective organizational controls, in terms 
of structures and routines. 
Similarly to other tragic events (e.g. Cornelissen, Mantere & Vaara, 2013; Weick, 1993; 
Weick, 2010), the sinking of the Costa Concordia has been seen primarily as an effect 
of the combined effects of human factors and organizational controls (Schröder-
Hinrichs, Hollnagel & Baldauf, 2012). To this extent the Costa Concordia unveils 
another paradoxical case of a high-reliability organization gone bad (e.g. Milosevic, 
Bass & Combs, 2015).  
We begin by introducing the concept of zemblanity; next we present the case data 
derived from juridical and investigative reports; the incident of the Costa Concordia can 
be easily substantiated by the reconstruction of events reported in the legal proceedings 
that occurred subsequent to the disaster. In order to grasp the details of the case the 
timeline of events critical to the unfolding of zemblanity were analysed. As our 
discussion illuminates, there are two overarching elements in play: an excess of 
individual discretion and a lack of organizational controls. We go on to consider the 
significant implications for both theory and practice that flow from our analysis. 
2. Introducing zemblanity  
 6 
 
While serendipity has gathered growing attention from the scholarly literature (Bonney, 
Clark, Collins & Faerle, 2007; Bouncken, 2011; Brown, 2005; Cunha, Clegg & 
Mendonça, 2010; Cunha et al., 2015; Liyanage, 2006) its lexical qualities, specifically 
the identity of an antonym, went unexplored for a long time, until William Boyd (1998) 
coined the term zemblanity. He conceived it as the antonym of serendipity by referring 
to an imaginary physical space, Zembla. Zembla is the opposite of Serendip1. Whilst 
Serendip was described as a “southern land of spice and warmth, lush greenery and 
hummingbirds, seawashed, sunbasted”, Zembla was “far north, barren, icebound, cold a 
world of flint stones” (Boyd, 1998, p. 234). For Boyd (1998), “zemblanity, the opposite 
of serendipity, [is] the faculty of making unhappy, unlucky and expected discoveries by 
design” (p. 234). Serendipity and zemblanity are the “twin poles of the axis around 
which we revolve” (p. 235). Hence zemblanity is conceived as the polar opposite of 
serendipity.  
Nicholson (2007) underlines that, at the individual level, “zemblanity counters the idea 
that we make our own good luck with the equal and opposite notion that we make our 
own misfortune” (p. 389). Behaviours take place in organizations under the rules and 
according to the roles expressed by the formal organizational structures and procedures, 
even when they operate at an extra-organizational level (Burton, 2013; Obel & Snow, 
2012). The design side of zemblanity has never been explored. In order to fill this gap, 
our proposal of organizational zemblanity will consider both the individual and the 
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intra- and extra-organizational features that might dialectically reinforce each other, 
eventually escalating to create disasters. While Boyd’s specification “by design” can be 
seen as the semantic opposite of “by chance” we describe how structures and 
procedures (“organization design”) can allow individual behaviours of a specific kind to 
trigger zemblanity. In doing so we attend to the “migration” of the concept of 
zemblanity initiated by Nicholson (2007) from being a literary conceit to one that 
informs the managerial field.  
While several fields of study have metaphorically exploited the concept of serendipity 
since Merton (1949) first introduced the concept into the sociology of science (see also 
Merton and Barber 2004), the antonym of zemblanity has been quite neglected. A 
systematic literature review (e.g. Denyer & Tranfield, 2009; Tranfield, Denyer & Smart, 
2003) found exceptions only in the field of medical sciences (e.g. Altarescu & Elstein, 
2005; Holubar, 2004; Pepys, 2007). Within this field, when science is defined as the 
practice of gathering knowledge and condensing it into testable laws and theories, 
serendipity “wonderfully enables and enriches good science” (Pepys, 2007, p. 565). 
Zemblanity, on the contrary, is associated with fraudulent or deceitful behaviour 
labelled as “bad science” (e.g. Park, 2001). So, in the medical field, a lack of rigour 
leads to progressively bad results, escalating from single cases to societal problems 
(Pepys, 2007). Within the same field, at a more micro-level, a solution/treatment/device 
that affords “an unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or 
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potential tissue damage … could be zemblaneous for clinical practice, but useful and 
beneficial for research” (Kontinen, 2007, p. 224). In the medical field serendipity and 
zemblanity have been constituted in terms of either epistemology and methodology 
(good/bad science and ways to produce it) or ontology (practice/research).  
In management, when serendipity has been used, it is in reference to the accidental 
discovery of something that, post hoc, generates value (Brown, 2005; Cunha, Clegg & 
Mendonça, 2010; Liyanage, 2006). Cunha et al. (2015) classify managerial serendipity 
as the state of being prepared for and open to novelty. Organizations can be open and 
responsive to serendipity, designed to embrace lucky events and transform them into 
value, via “structure and coordination mechanisms, and improvised various procedural, 
cognitive and normative variations” (Orlikowski, 1996, p. 63). The focal mechanism for 
managerial serendipity is generative doubt (Cunha et al., 2015), the motivated and 
conscious search for understanding stimulated by the experience of not knowing 
(Locke, Golden-Biddle & Feldman, 2008). Cunha et al. (2015) conclude that the 
cultivation of generative doubt plays a critical role in stimulating readiness for and 
responsiveness to serendipity. So, in management in distinction from the medical field, 
the emphasis, ceteris paribus, is placed on how organizations are designed and how the 
main organizational actors enact such design. 
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While serendipity can capture fortuitous discovery by design, zemblanity refers to 
unfortunate outcomes resulting from ill-conceived choices that the extant design allows. 
Within this framework, zemblanity can be pictured as the opposite of serendipity. The 
contemporary world offers many instances of zemblanity: pilots who return from the 
toilet to find themselves locked out of the cabin by a co-pilot inside the cabin, intent on 
mass murder and self-suicide, secure inside a security system that cannot be overridden 
from outside the cabin2; football fans who flee a fire in a grandstand and are trampled 
by the press of panic in front of turnstiles that do not reverse3. In this instance, the focus 
is on zemblanity in the context of the Costa Concordia tragedy. 
3. Method 
Retrospective narrative has guided the whole process of interpretation followed in 
defining the overarching dimensions of zemblanity. The narrative of the main 
protagonists has been obtained through juridically enacted accounts of purpose, danger, 
and roles reported (Weick, 2010) (Appendix A). Therefore, the zemblanity of Costa 
Concordia can be understood and captured as “an evolving product of conversations” 
enacted in the course of legal enquiry (Currie & Brown, 2003, p. 565). The capture of 
these conversations occurred within a legal framework of investigation that formally 
recorded all such discourse. As such, these conversations constituted an ongoing 
accomplishment of a social reality that emerged “from efforts to create order and make 
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retrospective sense” (Weick, 1993, p. 635) of events that indubitably occurred. In this 
sense, narratives made out of procedural and investigative conversations have a 
dramatic importance since in such contexts cues are extracted and information selected 
as well as decisions made about what are acceptable accounts (Brown, Stacey & 
Nandhakumar, 2007; Diedrich, Walter & Czarniawska, 2011) by actors possessing 
differentially distributed rights of examination and obligation to respond (Boden and 
Molotch 1994).  
We reconstruct and analyse the events of the Concordia case as well as the behaviours 
of its protagonists, in light of Tinker’s (1986) insight that the introduction of new 
metaphors (e.g. Morgan, 1980) has to consider the “social processes” embedding them 
and in which they are generated. Doing so, we acknowledge the power of analogies and 
metaphors as inductive forms of reasoning (e.g. Balogun et al. 2014; Cornelissen, Holt 
& Zundel, 2011). In giving substantiation to zemblanity this paper follows the 
interpretivist approach, as described by Gioia and Pitre (1990) in terms of “connections 
between human actions … and established organizational structures…” termed 
structurationism (Gioia & Pitre, 1990, p. 592).  
The evidence reported in the investigational and judicial documents, including all the 
prosecutors’ analyses, reprimands and closing speeches and the first proceedings of 
sentencing (with only one completed up to July 2015) provide the data. Hence, 
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multiple-data sourcing is used (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Remenyi et al., 1998). The 
main document is represented by the technical report released by the Ministry of 
Infrastructure soon after the sinking (IMIT, 2012). The understanding of the behaviour 
of the protagonists has been further analysed by using judicial documents, records of 
trials, etc. accessed via all the available Electronic Databases (DoGi, ForoItaliano, 
ItalgiureWeb-RELPEN) (period considered: 23/02/2013-11/07/2015, from the 
beginning of the proceedings to the publication of the rationale for the verdict).  
3.1. Situating the case: The timeline of events 
On 13 January 2012 at about 21:45 the cruise ship Costa Concordia (operated by Costa 
Crociere, a subsidiary of Carnival Corporation) was sailing north in the Tyrrhenian Sea. 
The cruise liner was heading to Savona (Italy) and had left Civitavecchia, the port city 
of Rome, about two hours earlier. The ship had a length of more than 290 metres and a 
beam of 35 meters. The Concordia was outfitted with approximately 1,500 cabins and 
that night was hosting 3,229 passengers and carried 1,023 crewmembers.  
While the vessel was cruising in calm seas and overcast weather (Appendix A, 
Prologue), Captain Francesco Schettino issued the order to “salute” the Isola del Giglio, 
an island off the western coast of Italy (Tuscany) (Figure 1, Route of disaster 13 Jan. 
2012; Appendix A, Phase 1)4. The salute resulted in the Costa Concordia hitting a rock 
in the proximity of the island (Appendix A, Phase 2). The impact tore a huge gash (50 
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m) on the port side of the hull, which soon flooded parts of the engine room, causing the 
critical arrest of the propulsion and the electrical systems. In the phase immediately 
subsequent to the impact, without sounding the alarm or reporting the incident to the 
coastal authority, the Captain performed an emergency manoeuvre in order to bring the 
cruise liner alongside the coast of the island (the appropriateness of such a move is still 
debated). A detailed storyline is reported in Appendix A. 
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------- 
Despite the ship gradually listing and sinking in shallow water in calm seas, with no 
possibility of restarting either the engines or the electrical systems, the order to abandon 
ship was not issued until over an hour after the initial impact. In the meantime, the 
Captain instructed his crew to tell the passengers that the vessel was simply 
experiencing a blackout so there was nothing for them to worry about. The same version 
of events was given to the maritime authorities. Later, Captain Schettino left the ship 
when it was still sinking, while there were still many passengers on board (Appendix A, 
Phase 3). The evacuation eventually took over six hours and not all passengers were 
evacuated (Appendix A, Phase 4 and 5). That night 32 people died: in addition to the 
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loss of human life there was also the damage created to the economic system and 
natural environment of the Isola del Giglio (Appendix A, Epilogue). 
In the specific case, in the trial that followed the disaster, the most influential members 
of the crew (the first officer, the second officers, the helmsman, the head of cabin 
service) and the company (the head of the crisis team) were sentenced to custody for 
multiple manslaughter, negligence and shipwreck. In fact, they engaged in plea-
bargaining in July 2013 in exchange for lenient sentences and in order to avoid jail. By 
contrast, the Captain did not engage in plea-bargaining. In February 2015 the 
Concordia’s Captain, Francesco Schettino, was sentenced for manslaughter, a sentence 
that is still appealable to higher courts.5  
3.2. Applying temporal bracketing to the case 
After immersing ourselves in the richness of the available evidences, we identified the 
investigative report produced by the Italian Ministry of Infrastructures and Transports 
(IMIT, 2012) as our central data source. Despite its technical origins, we chose this 
document because of its aseptic nature and neutrality. The other judicial documents 
have been used as secondary and complementary sources for interpreting the findings. 
Among them, the official judicial documents (produced from February 2012 to July 
2015) embedded and reported all the official statements released by the participants in 
the trial on all previous occasions. The secondary sources have been substantively 
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analysed in their original language (Italian) and then exposed to “in-context” validation 
(terms, words, expressions): facts and declarations are reported in this study as the 
international press reported them. Every single piece of evidence has been translated 
into scripts, and each of them has been coded [i.e. Public Prosecutor, 25/01/2015, 
content n. 13: PP.250115.13].  
Available evidence has been analysed in order to uncover successively deeper layers of 
meaning, within a research design inspired by the process of using data to question 
theory and theory to interpret data. The evidence has been organized and structured via 
temporal bracketing of the facts (Langley, 1999; Langley & Truax, 1994; Van de Ven, 
2007) within a more general framework of retroductive reconstruction of events (Poole 
et al., 2000). The reconstruction of the events, as a combination of facts and 
protagonists’ behaviour, is detailed in Appendix A. Data were organized into a structure 
with four levels of aggregation (see Figure 2), displaying (from left to right): the actual 
facts and the main protagonists’ behaviours (Figure 2, Events; Appendix A); first-order 
concepts; second-order themes, and overarching dimensions.  
To explore the case of Costa Concordia as a source of theory development informed by 
the logic of grounded theory, we followed three steps. Starting from the reconstruction 
of the events (Figure 2, Events; Appendix A), we proceeded to the extraction of the 
first-order concepts following a process of identification of the patterns that underlay 
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the donative “in-context” meanings (Figure 2, First-order concepts). The second-order 
themes were obtained via the aggregation of previous ones into deeper structures of 
meaning (Figure 2, Second-order themes), in which the first two labels (“smart idiocy” 
and “reckless optimism”) were inspired by the prosecutor’s analysis of the case 
[PP.250115.1-43]6.  
The derivation of the second-order themes and the resulting overarching dimensions has 
followed an original, interpretative and non-mechanical process (Langley, 1999). Such a 
process was based on iterations between data, conceptual explanation and the author’s 
efforts to make sense of what the data informed or were revealing about the problem 
being investigated (Clegg, Cunha & Rego, 2012). In order to guarantee reliability and 
acceptability of the interpretations the study sought emergence of holistic understanding 
(Garud, Gehman & Kumraswamy, 2011), conducted via a specific protocol. The first 
author collected and organized the data and was subsequently questioned and 
interrogated by the co-authors to test the plausibility of the interpretations (Mantere, 
Schildt & Sillince, 2012) and to identify redundant convergence (Sandberg, 2000) in 
developing the overarching dimensions (Figure 2, Overarching dimensions). The overall 
exercise of induction then led to the definition of the first-order concepts, to their 
aggregation into second-order themes and the two overarching dimensions. Considering 
the methodology and qualitative nature of the investigation, our account should be 
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considered as one possible and plausible interpretation, albeit one extremely well 
grounded in the legally constituted facts of the matter at hand. 
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------- 
 
3.3. Deriving meanings from dialectics 
Similarly to the proposal of Cunha et al. (2015) on serendipity, the zemblanity of Costa 
Concordia will be illustrated in dialectic terms considering both human/individual and 
organizational factors (organizational controls) and their mutual interactions. The use of 
dialectic for analysing real-life phenomena is widely diffused in the organizational 
literature (e.g. Bartunek, 2006; Costanzo & Di Domenico, 2014; Cunha et al., 2015; Di 
Domenico, Tracey & Haugh, 2009; Ford & Ford, 1994; Putnam, 2015; Vlaar, Van Den 
Bosch & Volberda, 2007). In this vein the analysis of Rus (1980) on the dialectics of 
power provides a useful framework for the investigation of the case. Rus (1980) 
reminds us that for Hegel the dialectic is a process of realization created by things that 
contain their own negation; through this realization the parts are transcended into 
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something greater (positive). While the positive element is central to the Hegelian 
perspective (see also Swingewood, 1970 & Kainz, 1988), Adorno (1966), by proposing 
negative dialectics, rejected the necessity of such a positive element. In Adorno’s 
negative dialectics the result of realization is still something greater than the parts that 
preceded it but it is something essentially negative (Adorno, 1966). The negative 
dialectic is functional to the analysis of the case of Costa Concordia in terms of 
managerial zemblanity. The substantiation of the overarching dimensions and their 
dialectic interplay is explained in the next paragraphs. 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Bold leadership and vicious circles 
Nurtured by “bold leadership” as defined by Masuch (1985), serendipity offers learning 
and innovation by virtue of design that exhibits preparedness for chance’s offerings; 
zemblanity, by contrast, is an explicit or implicit organizational design that spawns 
decisions that turn out to constitute a vicious circle. As we shall see, this is precisely 
what transpired when the ship hit a submerged reef as it performed a sail-by salute.  
The order to perform the “salute” was not the first of this kind, as the Captain 
announced: “Let’s get very close to Giglio, I love doing these «salutes»” [C.081013.3]. 
Even during the trials, the Captain admitted to having done such sail-by salutes before 
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without disaster (see also Figure 2, previous cruise 14 Aug. 2011) [C.081013.3], as  
many other commanders probably had done. In the Costa Concordia case the sail-by 
salute (incident)  the event of the hull being penetrated  procrastination in sounding 
the alarm  flooding of the vessel with people still on board  undermining of the 
reported damages and exigencies (endangering people)  abandoning the ship (no 
governance of the evolution of the incident and its consequences).  
4.2. Order created by rules and imperative command 
The focus on human factors permits one to analyse the Concordia Captain’s behaviour, 
as well as the behaviour of other protagonists. Responsibility for the sinking and 
subsequent manslaughter should not be attributed solely to the Captain but should also 
be attributed to crewmembers and other company managers, in an overall organized 
system that unpredictably and ex post proved to be structurally flawed in its 
vulnerability to human initiative. Within such a framework, other individuals were seen 
to have adopted “immoral behaviour [stemming] from a person [the Captain] of little 
integrity with weak character” (Nohria, Sucher & Gurtler, 2004, p. 1). “The sail-by was 
planned out by Schettino before departing from Civitavecchia, noted on the chart and 
recorded on the integrated navigation system. … [The Captain] told the Navigation 
Officer: «Come here, we plot a course to pass close to the Giglio and make the sail-by»” 
[TO.280112.4]. The officials in command seemed to suffer from a form of “unreflective 
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obedience” à la Milgram (1974), an attitude of subordination that validated the 
organizational legitimacy of Captain Schettino in not only detouring from the regular 
route but also did not resist his behaviour during the most dramatic phases of the 
sinking. In fact, the Captain and his staff were fully aware that the vessel was seriously 
compromised twenty minutes after the collision. However neither the Captain nor any 
of his officers contacted the competent authority (Coastguard Command) for activating 
the Search and Rescue (SAR) procedures, as the international maritime rules would 
have demanded (Appendix A, Phase 2).  
Around five minutes before the collision the Captain took manual command of the 
vessel. At this point, “both the First Officer and the helmsman are totally aware of the 
Captain’s intention” [TO.280112.4], as was the Second Officer who was engaged in the 
manoeuvre as well (IMIT, 2012, p. 28). After the collision, “contacted [by the 
Coastguard] the [ship’s] Safety Trainer reports that the unit is in «black out» and some 
checks are in progress; does not prompt other assistance” (IMIT, 2012, p. 31).  
The evidence demonstrates that the actors were subject to structural over-determination 
in losing sight of their responsible agency (Lukes, 1974; Rus, 1980) and sense of moral 
purpose (Weick, 2010). Where the existence of a rigid and strict chain of command, by 
virtue of position, grants organizational legitimacy, then obedience to superordinate 
orders is the norm or default position. Such a position accords with Follett’s (1924, 
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1941) discussion of power and control in situations of “power over”, where claims to 
legitimate authority and obedience to it are contingent on position, rather than being 
founded on a substantive claim. In such situations it is imperative command that rules. 
A situation of imperative command stands in contrast to one of “power with”, where the 
fact that individuals accept and execute orders within a social process of self-control 
and exercise of free will, serves as the justification for obedience or not (Follett, 1941). 
In this situation, an individual entitled to give orders neither “dominates” nor “controls” 
the receiver(s) but “together” they control themselves (Follet, 1924). Indeed, the 
intermingling and exchange of views is part of a continuous social process, producing 
collective thought and collective will (Parker, 1984) in which substantive rationalities 
are weighed and assessed. In such a case “following orders” constitutes a “circular 
structure” that regulates the social process of interaction between “givers” and 
“receivers”. Any order given must be consonant with the individual judgments of those 
delegated to carry out the order in question. There is scope for reflection, legitimacy 
attached to reflexivity and questioning that obedience to imperative command renders 
irrelevant and impossible.  
In the specific case of Costa Concordia the crew was subject to two orders: to perform 
“the sail-by salute” and to delay sounding the alarm after the collision. Although the 
practice of ‘saluting’ dates back to ancient times (e.g., to salute crewmembers’ family 
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on land), it is currently used as an occasion to provide tourists with a better view of the 
places the ship passes by. Within the specific context of cruise ship practice, despite 
implying a breach of major rules, the practice acquired a degree of legitimate “sense”, 
whereby the notion of being a cruise passenger involved their participating in a 
spectacular experience economy (e.g. Pine & Gilmore, 1998). The sight of the huge 
cruise ship close to land affords a spectacle for those on shore and a unique experience 
for those on board the ship as they look down, literally, on those on the land. Sailing 
traditions and touristic interest in spectacular experiences do not accord, however, with 
formal organizational rules. In the specific case of Costa Concordia it was considered by 
both the maritime rules and the company’s internal code of conduct to be an “unsafe 
practice” to conduct a salute of this nature (ICSS, 1914; SOLAS, 1974; IMO 2010, 
2012; CFI, 2012, p. 33).  
With regard to the delay in raising the alarm after the collision, international maritime 
law states that in cases where the hull is breached in a collision of any kind that poses 
the risk of the ship sinking, the order to abandon ship has to be issued immediately and 
all passengers must be evacuated within 30 minutes (IMO 2010-2012, under SOLAS 
Chapter III Regulation 21.1.4). The order to abandon ship was delayed by Captain 
Schettino for more than one hour, with the evacuation of the vessel taking over six 
hours, with not all passengers being evacuated and the captain abandoning his post 
before the security of his passengers and crew was established.  
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A contradictory element (e.g. Clegg, Cunha & Cunha, 2002; Costanzo & Di Domenico, 
2014; Smith & Lewis, 2011) is evident in the relation between the personal authority of 
imperative command and the legitimacy of impersonal rules, as shown in the case. In 
high-reliability contexts, such as cruising, a high level of formalization of structural 
relations in rules is deployed as a device for organizational controls meant to guarantee 
safety for passengers and crew. While deference to authority is embedded in these 
structural relations it is embodied in a figure literally in control of the vessel. The 
combination of impersonal rules with highly personalized control does not always serve 
formal authority. Embodied control, in the figure of the master and commander, can 
over-determine the prudence inscribed in rules and constrain the judgments made by 
those subject to imperative command. Even in highly formalized sectors, individuals in 
command can easily execute deviations from the rules. Such deviations can also exceed 
the boundaries of the single organization (meant as the vessel), reaching out to higher 
levels such as headquarters. As the company crisis manager admitted: “Schettino asked 
me to tell the maritime authorities that the collision was down to a blackout on the ship. 
But I strongly objected… That was a different false account compared to what he had 
said before, namely that he had hit a rock which caused the ship to flood. I remember I 
got quite angry and I shared that reaction with my colleagues” [CCC.190414.7]. In 
reality, more than 30 minutes after the collision, “Despite the serious actual situation (at 
least two compartments flooded, lack of propulsion, lack of power from the emergency 
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generator and the failure of the bilge pumps) [the Captain] has not yet been given the 
general emergency and so far the Company has not made direct contact with the 
national SAR organization” (IMIT, 2012, p. 32).   
4.3. Human factors: high discretion 
The Costa Concordia case unfolded from the decision made by the Captain when he 
gave the order to cruise dangerously close to the coast. He admitted in court that he had 
already performed such “show boating” in the past. He assured the crew on past 
occasions, as he recently did the court, that he was constantly in control of the situation. 
Nonetheless, he left the vessel before many of the passengers. In so doing he showed a 
lack of self-analysis and reflexive questioning of his own behaviour (e.g. Nicholson, 
2007). As he clearly put it: “I was number one on the ship after God” [C.031214.31]. 
Nonetheless, during the trial he constantly blamed somebody else (e.g. the officers, the 
helmsman, the company) or something else (e.g. the charts – presence of uncharted 
rocks) for the disaster.7 Both before and after the crash he exploited his high level of 
autonomy and discretionary power.  
The Captain does not represent the zemblanity of Costa Concordia alone although the 
organizational process that resulted in zemblanity was triggered by him. In addressing 
the Captain during the proceedings, the prosecutor combined two existing “cases” in 
Italian jurisprudence [PP.250115.17-36]: the “smart idiot”, meaning somebody feeling 
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so confident as to generate dangerous situations, which he conjoined with the case of 
the “reckless optimist”, where someone combines optimism with an overvaluing of their 
actual capacity (Figure 3, a). Building on these two cases, the prosecutors dialectically 
synthetized the emergent category of the “reckless idiot”, in which both the “smart 
idiot” and the “reckless optimist” “cohabited”, as if the Captain was “two-headed” 
(bicephalous) [PP.250115.34]. In this vein, the prosecutor’s closing speech at the trial 
synthetized the Captain’s behaviour in terms of negative dialectic (Adorno, 1966), in 
which the positive forces (smartness, optimism) lost out to the negative ones (idiocy, 
recklessness) with the result of a lethal combination of the latter (idiocy and 
recklessness) (Figure 3, a1, a2).  
In short, in executing his total discretion, Captain Schettino showed a lack of doubt in 
what he was doing, before the collision (sail-by salute) as well as after the collision (the 
delay in raising the alarm). In both cases he exploited an excess of discretion and acted 
in violation of maritime norms and safety regulations. He acted as master and 
commander, making and not making imperative commands, rather than as a bureaucrat, 
diligently responsible to rules (Figure 3, a3). 
The extension of Adorno’s negative dialectics to the case of Costa Concordia starts with 
two “constitutive elements” (second-order themes). The categories of the “smart idiot” 
and the “reckless optimist” reciprocally contain their own negation; such negations can 
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be found in the second-order themes (Figure 2). The “smart idiot” captures one who 
does “show boating” with a cruise vessel with more than 4,000 people on board (first-
order concepts: Excess of self-confidence, Boldness, Managerial illusion). Being a 
“reckless optimist” captures the actions of someone who delays evacuation and later 
abandons the ship (first-order concepts: Immobilism, Fear, Lack of risk evaluation, Lack 
of courage – hoping for an act of God to fix the eventful disaster). The “reckless idiot” 
(a synthesis of the first order concepts) is a person who creates negative dialectics on a 
grand scale: 32 deaths, damage to the company’s reputation, and national shame. 
Despite all that, the Captain defended that had he taken different decisions after the 
collision “… It would have been carnage. A divine hand surely touched my head. There 
are those who say the impact with the stern was caused because I was suffering from a 
hallucination. What hallucination! It was rather my instinct, my skills, the ability to 
know the sea and suddenly change direction” [C.050712.4]. The further description of 
how some other individuals contribute to the “creation” or the “destruction” of such 
self-image is extensively reported in Appendix A. 
----------------------------------------- 




4.4. Organizational controls: Formalization and lack of tackling mechanisms  
Consideration of the organizational setting in which the tragedy of Costa Concordia 
occurred sheds additional light on its structural features. In fact, further analysis of the 
structures framing the individuals’ behaviours unveils a kind of “retrospective 
prophecy” (e.g. Huxley, 1880) that we label as “designed zemblanity”. In this vein, two 
major considerations arose.  
First, despite the high level of formalization and the absolute priority of safety in the 
sector, the organizations involved (at various levels of aggregation: the vessel, the 
Company, the Italian coastguard system) did not have any inter- or extra-organizational 
mechanisms (routines) able to tackle irregular conduct (Figure 2; Appendix A); the crew 
did not mutiny by questioning the imperative command, to which they were 
accustomed. The refusal to dispute authority could be seen as an intuitive deference 
habituated in the crew. In this sense, even when the law allows mutiny, as it would in 
such a case, defence of hierarchy as a structure was upheld against the perception of 
danger that many officers experienced during the hazardous manoeuvres and after the 
crash. In terms of extra-organizational mechanism the vessel’s destiny was subject to 
conflicting hierarchies (e.g. the coastguard and the company crisis managers, 
respectively, vs. the Captain). From the moment in which the order to “abandon ship” 
was issued by the Captain, the coastguard commander was formally in charge of the 
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operations. After about three hours from the collision, the coastguard commander 
realized that the Captain had left the vessel with passengers and crew still aboard and 
urged the Captain to “Get back aboard! Damn it!” [CGC.130112.15].8 The Captain did 
not execute the order. As a matter of fact, apart from the coastguard officials, both the 
crew and the rest of the organization (at all levels) displayed an absence of “generative 
doubt”; they considered the legitimacy of the commander and the existence of 
emergency procedures (major structures) as sufficient to generate appropriate decisions 
and actions (Figure 3, b).Further, even when all the available modern technology (e.g. 
Electronic Chart Display and Information System – ECDIS, Global Positioning System 
– GPS, Automatic Radar Plotting Aid – ARPA, etc.) works perfectly, the design of 
commanding roles can inhibit any possible intervention and external recovery. In the 
case of Costa Concordia, anomalous cruising trajectories are detectable by remote 
instruments but on-board control cannot be overridden from outside (Figure 1). Once 
again, an undoubted trust in the interaction between human discretion and the formal 
structures operating at the organizational level (on board the ship, in this case) was 
evident. 
4.5. Human factors and organizational controls: A synthesis for discussion 
Investigation of the behaviours of the agents concerned demonstrates individual causes 
of the sinking of the Costa Concordia. Additionally, the persistence of some structures 
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(e.g. hierarchy) and the absence of others (e.g. emergency routines) justified the fact 
that nobody took action to tackle the Captain’s behaviour while the catastrophe was 
actually unfolding. In short, even if the Captain’s actions could be reconstituted as an 
effect of bounded rationality, consideration of the structural elements reveals a lack of 
organizational design; indeed, it was a “design for Zembla”, hence zemblanity, in 
Boyd’s (1998) terms. In both cases, the absence of generative doubt clearly emerges at 
both the individual and the collective level. 
In a Weberian fashion, the possession by actors of rational competence represents one 
of the grounds for the existence of legitimate rules that constitute the formalized side of 
the organization (Weber, 1947). It is these rules that enable the imperative command of 
a hierarchical organization such as the crew of a cruise ship. Consequently, seen as a 
dialectical relation, “high discretion” and “organizational controls” may be antithetical 
elements mutually sustaining thesis and antithesis (Figure 3, c). The interactive 
contamination of the two (the Hegelian sublation) seemingly guarantees organizational 
effectiveness, with human discretion complementing the lack of rules, governing their 
interpretation, while the formalized roles define the perimeter of the decision maker’s 
autonomy (discretion). The dialectical combination of human factors and the enacted 
dynamics of organizational controls are pictured by the First Officer in the following 
quotes: “The captain was distracted [also by the guests on the bridge]. [Later,] he was 
on the telephone with [a retired Costa Captain] … Even though I had finished my shift, 
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I felt I had to retake command in order to give orders to the helmsman to start our 
approach to Giglio Island, which was getting closer” [FO.171213.4]; “[The Captain] 
arrived in the command centre accompanied by a woman, then gave an order to switch 
to manual control of the helm” [FO.171213.7]. (The woman was later identified as an 
unregistered female guest, who was posited to be having an affair with the Captain). 
The case of Costa Concordia shows how the absence of generative doubt triggered a 
negative dialectical process (Adorno, 1966), in which high discretion, combined with an 
event (e.g. the crash), generated a sequence of bad choices (e.g. delayed evacuation) that 
turned into manslaughter (negative dialectical synthesis: an even greater negative 
event). In such a spiral of zemblanity, both formalization and discretion appear to be 
highly vulnerable. Symmetrically with Cunha et al. (2015), the absence of generative 
doubt can be seen to transform a single event into an escalating spiral, as a case of 
negative dialectics (Figure 3).  
5. Discussion  
The facts of events occurring in the case of Costa Concordia, as constituted during the 
investigation and the trial (Figure 2; Appendix A), combined with the analysis of the 
human factors and organizational controls and their interaction, allow us to identify 
some characteristics of the process of zemblanity. The overarching elements seem to be 
twofold: an excess of individual discretion and an excess of organizational 
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formalization. In the case of Costa Concordia, the latter paradoxically resulted in a lack 
of organizational controls, at both the organizational (vessel) and supra-organizational 
levels (company, maritime control and governance systems).  
In the case of the Costa Concordia the process of organizational zemblanity was not 
contained by the formal organization (Figure 4, a) “expected by design” of the frame of 
laws, rules, and organizational roles. Organizational systems (companies and their 
surrounding environments) try to prevent the occurrence of untoward events via both 
human factors (e.g. prudence, interpretation of rules in favour of major goals like safety) 
and organizational controls (e.g. supportive technology, the possibility of mutiny in the 
face of illogical orders). In this vein, adherence to the “normal” route and the non-
deactivation of the cruising monitoring system could have prevented the “salute” and 
the endangering of the vessel. The activation of the emergency procedures and 
compliance with them would have reduced the actual damage (Figure 4, a): in the case 
of Concordia, an immediate alarm would have saved more lives [J1.020613.27; 
J2.130715.13].  
The fact that human factors can overtake organizational controls can be a trigger for 
zemblanity (Figure 4, b). The element of organizational formalization was expressed in 
obedience to the substantive demands of imperative command rather than following 
abstract rules, which combined with a lack of back-up organizational routines able to 
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tackle irregular conduct. In this case, imperative command had expanded to such an 
extent that there was an excess of discretion (“reckless idiocy”) on the part of the 
subject in charge of decision and actions. Imperative command became extreme 
boldness and self-confidence on the part of the organization’s chief decision-maker (the 
Captain of the cruise ship). In combination with a lack of risk evaluation, even where 
the organization had the most modern technology at its disposal (radars, scanners, etc.), 
human action overcame the constitutive entanglement of social and material objects and 
the powers residing in them (Orlikowski, 2007). Under the mandate of imperative 
command, a managerial illusion of control (Ciborra & Lanzara, 1994) was fostered that 
led to a vicious circle of incorrect decisions (e.g. Cunha & Tsoukas, 2015), eventually 
generating a dramatic drift of the organization (Ciborra & Hanseth, 2000). In the 
specific case, incorrect judgment was complemented by a persistently bold attitude, 
maintained even during the trial, revealing a refusal of self-criticism or doubt.  
If serendipity is a synthesis of preparation and openness to novelty augmented by 
generative doubt (Cunha et al. 2015), the previous discussion shows a case expressing a 
lack of cognitive, behavioural and organizational preparation as well as an uncritical 
evaluation of risks. The event of colliding with the reef demonstrated such deficiencies, 
as did the dramatic phases of the sinking. In addition, there was an absence of openness 
towards changing actions already taken as events unfolded (e.g. non-response to 
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external advices) and, last but not least, there was an absence of generative doubt, both 
at the organizational and the individual levels (Figure 4, b). 
In summary, the case displays managerial zemblanity as a combination of excesses and 
absences that ended up producing an unusual destiny. The sequence of events shows 
that an excess of discretion and an excess of standardization co-occurred with an 
absence of any tendencies necessary to counter such excesses. Among these tendencies, 
internal hierarchies that accepted direction from the top as imperative command, 
irrespective of substantive content, together with external assumptions on the part of 
company and regulatory authorities that “due diligence” in terms of compliance with 
abstract rules was to be expected by all the actors involved, escalated the catastrophe. 
The case also reveals that, under these circumstances, an excess of standardization 
might not actually prevent an excess of discretion so much as present a façade of formal 
compliance. In this vein, formal rigour is a distant proxy of actual behaviour. The case 
shows that standardization, rules and professional socialization might secure formal 
control but that they can also override the display of positive qualities from those 
subject to imperative command at the frontline. Leadership requires enacted, active 
constraints, prescribed and enforced under the regime of organization design. No form 
of organizational and supra-organizational design is sufficient to substitute for good 
judgment and professionalism, even in cases in which the importance of superior values 
(e.g. safety of human lives) is evident. Comfort with imperatively commanded but 
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informal routines, coupled with unbridled optimism and a desire to stand out and show 
off, may precipitate processes that are impossible to contain.  
In synthesis, the combination of an excess of discretion and high formalization of 
organizational controls may, through expansion of the consequences of a single event 
through subsequent collateral events, generate a vicious circle escalating disaster 
(Figure 4, b). In the case of Costa Concordia the core of the events begins with the 
Captain ordering the “salute”, switching to manual mode and taking command of the 
vessel, and ended with him leaving the sinking ship with endangered people still on 
board. In a space of about 185 minutes only, Captain Schettino practically, 
experimentally, demonstrated the existence of organizational zemblanity. 
----------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE  
----------------------------------------- 
6. Opportunities for future research 
The unveiling of zemblanity as dialectics fits with a wider discourse that could be 
explored in future research. First, the proposed concept of zemblanity partially overlaps 
with the idea of “functional stupidity”, as proposed by Alvesson and Spicer (2012). In 
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particular, both zemblanity and stupidity deviate from the dominant route of embedding 
“smartness” in abstracted frameworks; further, zemblanity reflects the characteristics of 
a lack of reflexivity (inability or unwillingness to question knowledge). What separates 
zemblanity from functional stupidity is a wider consideration of the effects of generative 
doubt on organizational dynamics. In fact, while functional stupidity relies on a lack of 
both substantive reasoning and justification (actors not demanding or providing reasons 
for explanation), the case of Costa Concordia shows that actors could also intentionally 
comply with something that they might consider “stupid” as long as their behaviour is 
consistent with their own agendas (e.g. concerns about career, penalties for 
insubordination, etc.). The concepts of “relational power” (Follet, 1924, 1941) and 
“unreflective obedience” (Milgram, 1974) easily coexist in zemblanity, as in other 
phenomena that could be observed at different levels of aggregation (e.g. Willmott, 
1993). 
Second, the case and its conceptualization show that in very formalized systems human 
discretion can neutralize organizational (or wider, societal) goals. In this vein, 
uncertainty remains the nemesis of modern management (Tsoukas, 2005), as 
organizations tend to reinforce formal procedures and structures as the risk of 
(unexpected) events increase (e.g. terrorist attacks). Third, people use their discretion 
with discretion: they do not expose themselves to adverse judgments by breaking a 
major substantive rule, such as the power of imperative command and the hierarchy in 
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which it is embodied while choosing to resist other formal rules through following 
orders and not mutinying. Fourth, Captain Schettino deliberately showed off, acting as a 
leader, as a charismatic master and commander, against the rules, in order to “be 
different”, to demonstrate his seafaring skills and, ultimately, express his ego. In this 
vein, formalization can be seen as an “equalizing structure” that individual discretion 
can contradict. In the absence of self-criticism or generative doubt this can lead to 
zemblanity.  
There is a disturbing opportunity to explore, however: when highly formalized systems 
reduce individual discretion and empowerment, displays of prowess can offer a form of 
“resistance against the system”, an adequate vehicle for expressing one’s “rage against 
the machine” of bureaucracy. In this regard, the cases of aircraft pilots that use security 
rules with destructive purposes or security agents that express their individuality by 
countering their security obligations, open important cues in the study of high reliability 
systems and how these may be insufficient to control human discretion. Existing 
studies, despite recognizing the relevance of human factors, have not sufficiently 
investigated their interaction with organizational controls (e.g. Schröder-Hinrichs, 
Hollnagel & Baldauf, 2012).  
7. Boundary conditions 
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The case has a number of characteristics that define its boundary conditions. It refers to 
a single event with unique features, one that offers extreme theoretical clarity. The lack 
of concordance with the formal rules of maritime activity on the part of the captain can 
be viewed as exceptional and therefore not relevant for most organizational events. 
However, there is the matter of the experience economy in which cruise ships play an 
increasing role. Experiencing nature close up, whether in Antarctica or the Tyrrhenian 
Sea, is inherently dangerous9. In more “normal” conditions the risks may be much less 
but so will be the experiential rewards to the passengers. The case’s exceptional 
qualities may also not apply in situations where singular authority is mediated by other 
hierarchical mechanisms. Correspondence between this industry and crew resource 
management in aviation offers promising equivalences in terms of creating more alert 
systems immune to the dysfunctional aspects of hierarchy (Heeks & Bhatnagar, 2001).  
8. Implications for practice 
To the extent that zemblanity embeds a “set of mechanisms for making sense of social 
processes” (Davis, 2015, p. 314) the case has important implications for practice. The 
first is that organizations should not assume that prudence and professionalism are 
embrained, habitually ingrained and normally embodied in highly trained professionals. 
Professionalism can be intermittent and vulnerable to human expressions of vanity, for 
which leadership provides ample opportunities, as this case indicates.  
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The case also contributes to the exploration of the symptoms of disaster making as a 
process that evolves in stages. Identifying the symptoms of disaster and countering them 
through distributed forms of leadership can constitute a form of prevention that also 
involves its own risks (e.g. Diedrich, Walter & Czarniawska, 2011). For example, 
distributing leadership may create confusion that is problematic. In other words, in 
solving one specific problem, organizations may actually create another problem, 
suggesting that security issues may have the qualities of being wicked problems 
(Churchman, 1967; Head & Alford, 2013). In this sense, a critical question for practice 
is how to combine standardization and empowerment, hierarchical clarity and 
distributed cognition, formalization and discretion, and so on. Recent examples, such as 
this case and the Germanwings disaster, suggest that the wicked problems associated 
with directing high risk systems requires more attention to be paid to how people 
actively construct zemblanity in their organizational systems.  
9. Conclusion 
The disaster of the Costa Concordia cruise ship was neither just an unfortunate event 
nor just a case of bad leadership. Leadership requires structured constraint and in this 
case there was none that was effective; leadership without constraint creates a tyranny 
of judgment; in this case, a context of designed zemblanity produced a lack of 
generative doubt, which, combining with an unnecessary and unfortunate event, 
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dialectically amplified negativity. Zemblanity, occasioning negative dialectics, created a 
fatal combination. A sequence of bad choices resulted from a lack of organizational 
controls able to moderate the effects of a leader’s illusions about the scope of his 
powers. Even in a sector characterized by high reliability (cruising) and high levels of 
formalization of standards and procedures, managerial dynamics (as a corruption of 
technique) can allow the organization to drift dramatically (transformation of the 
organization; Lozeau, Langley & Denis, 2002). To add a touch of humaneness, we can 
also consider the fact that, when issuing the order for the “salute”, Captain Schettino 
was romancing and entertaining an unregistered female passenger.  
The article explored how organizations, even those designed to be highly reliable, can 
end up being vulnerable to human decisions that are not predicted by the system and 
that produce vicious circles that lead to disaster. The article’s central proposition is that 
the notion of zemblanity, thus far unincorporated by the scholarly literature, can help to 
illuminate the reason why organizations sometimes create inflections of events that 
ultimately surprise and end badly: “bad luck” is socially constructed and 
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1 Serendip refers to the Persian and Urdu name of Sri Lanka, but the actual origins of the term serendipity 
are contested amongst scholars. In fact, it is still debated whether the book “The Three Princes of 
Serendip” has to be attributed to the Venetian Michele Tramezzino (1557) or to the English Horace 
Walpole (1754) (e.g. Boyd, 1998; Hodges, 1964; Remer, 1965). 
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germanwings_Flight_9525 (accessed 16 September 2015). 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bradford_City_stadium_fire (accessed 16 September 2015). 
4 A salute comprises a close ‘sail-by’ of a landform by a large vessel, affording a spectacle for those on 
land as a giant vessel hoves close by; hence, a “sail-by salute” is an out-of-route manoeuvre that brings a 
ship close to shore to “salute” those on land.  
5 The paper cannot deliver a definitive account of the Costa Concordia affair because, to date, legal 
process has not been wholly elaborated. However, we can elaborate on the facts as the prosecutors 
reconstructed these during the first proceedings. Having the other persons in charge admit their guilt 
without further investigations, the main focus will be on Captain Schettino’s conduct and defence. 
6 It is important to remark that the aggregation of the first-level concepts into the second-order themes has 
not followed the way in which the prosecutor has categorized facts and events. Our method uses not 
reportage but analytics. 
7 Such an attitude was already detected by Captain Schettino former commander who noted: “I made a 
negative report on him with a note about his behaviour. Schettino was respectful but frequently tended to 




                                                                                                                                                                          
8 The dramatic conversation, with English subtitles can be retrieved here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WX_08zcCmx8 (accessed on 18 Sept 2015). 
9 http://www.seattletimes.com/life/travel//are-polar-cruises-safe-not-all-ships-are-equal/ (accessed 16 
September 2015). 
